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Abstract
Wage ratios across di¤erent percentiles of the distribution have moved in parallel and then
diverged in the U.S. in the last 50 years. I build a simple model of heterogeneous technology
and workers that features complementarities in production and love-for-variety in consumption
and identify the macro-, talent- and individual-specic components of the wage function. I
build the theoretical counterparts of the observed wage ratios, and show that both skill-biased
technical change and trade between identical countries can reproduce the observed pattern of
wage dispersion. This fact arises from qualitatively similar local responses of the marginal vs.
the total price of skills. I argue that intra-rm rent distribution can be used to disentangle these
causes.
First Draft: April 16, 2009.
Keywords: intra-industry trade; skill-biased technical change; local change in inequality;
intra-rm rent distribution.
1 Introduction
A number of studies have shown that wage inequality in the United States has been increasing
throughout the last 50 years. The ratio of wages at the 50th vs. 10th percentile, and 90th vs. 50th
percentile in the distribution, grew each approximately 10% from 1973 to 1987. After that, the
lower tail attened, while the upper tail continued to grow 10% more through 2004 (Autor, Katz
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the title "Commercio Internazionale, Eterogeneitae Diseguaglianze nella Distribuzione del Reddito". I am deeply
indebted toward Paolo Epifani and Fabrizio Onida for their guidance on that work. A longer version of this paper
has circulated at various times in the past years under the title "Two Sided Heterogeneity, Technology and Trade".
Thomas Chaney, James Heckman, Samuel Kortum and Ralph Ossa provided patient guidance, insightful critiques
and careful comments and suggestions on this project. This paper has greatly beneted from discussions with Pierre
AndreChiappori, Jonathan Eaton, Paolo Epifani, Stefania Garetto, Gene Grossman, Lance Lochner, Marc Melitz,
Marc-Andreas Muendler, Lars Nesheim, Jaromir Nosal, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Nancy Stokey and participants at
the working groups on Capital Theory and International Trade and the University of Chicago, and International
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and Kearney (2005), (2006)). At extreme high values in the wage distribution, inequality started
increasing in the sixties, and grew even more markedly (Piketty and Saez (2003), (2004))1.
There seems to be a consensus that an increase in demand biased toward skilled workers is at
the origin of these facts, and that that much of the increase in inequality has been observed within
sectors (see for example Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994)).
But what caused this increase, and how can we explain the non-monotonic behavior of the wage
ratios?
Skill-biased technical change and trade integration are the two most prominent candidates for
an explanation2. To sort them out, we need to be explicit about the distinctive aspects of each; to
take a stance on their e¤ect on rm-level outcomes; and to show how changes in wage ratios are
generated in an economy with those features.
This paper takes up these steps and ask the following two questions: 1) Can skill-biased technical
change and trade integration produce the same observed pattern for inequality within a unied
framework? And if so, 2) Can rm-level data help to disentangle the two causes? The answer to
these questions are yes, and yes: by examining the equilibrium responses of the wage function in a
heterogeneous population of workers and rms, I show that the evolution of wage ratios described
above can be rationalized independently by both the forces considered, and show what evidence
needs to be provided to tell apart the two mechanisms. The neatness of the results is obtained at
the price of strong reliance on functional form assumptions, which is admittedly in no way general,
although often standard. However, it will be a virtue of the model the ability to clearly answer the
questions posed.
To frame my argument, I consider two identical economies with a potentially unbounded mass
of goods, where varieties are characterized by heterogeneous e¢ ciencies in their technology, in
the spirit of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). I extend this framework by assuming
that workers are heterogeneous in their ability to run any rm (if they choose so), while they
are identical as production workers at the rmsproduction lines: a rm is then made up by an
idea, a manager, and production workers3. Complementarities between technology and ability4
imply positive assortative matching between managers and technological e¢ ciency5, producing a
"superstars" e¤ect as in Rosen (1981). The occupational choice implies that the wage of the
1For example, from 1960 to 2004 the ratio between the wage at the 99th and the 95th percentile changed from
1.6 to 2; in the same period, the ratio 99.9-99 increased from 1.7 to 2.2, and the ratio 99.99-99.9 increased from 2.1
to 4.4. Looking at the overall wage distribution, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) document a 72% increase in the
variance of log-weekly wages for males between 1963 and 1989, showing how the change in log real wages is essentially
a linear function of the percentile in the wage distribution.
2These are by no means the only two causes put forth. Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) consider the consequences
of shifts in labor force compositions in terms of education and experience. Card and Di Nardo (2002) provide a general
critique of the skill-biased technical change hypothesis.
3This is similar to Garicano and Rossi-Hansbserg (2006), where a rm is instead made by di¤erent layers of workers
with heterogeneous ability.
4Log-supermodularity, in the terms of Costinot (2009))
5Sattinger (1979) is the rst to propose this framework. This paper generalizes his contribution, introducing a
fully-edged general equilibrium model where the outside options are endogenously determined. Sattinger (1993)
gives a review and a motivation for using assingment models to study wage distributions.
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manager if she was a production worker plays the role of the xed selling cost in the domestic
market, giving rise to increasing returns to scale at the rm level (as in Krugman (1979)). A xed
cost of exporting produces the endogenous selection of most productive rms in the foreign market.
I model skill-biased technical change as an increase in the contribution of ideas to rm-level
productivity. While all rms gain from this increase, complementarities in production ensure that
better managers gain more than proportionately relative to average managers. Moreover, I model
trade integration as a path of progressive reduction in trade costs between two identical countries:
since trade has been mostly intra-industry, I shut down on purpose any motive for trade related to
di¤erences in technology or endowments.
To answer the rst question of this paper, I build the theoretical counterpart of wage ratios at
two (arbitrary) levels of the skill spectrum and examine how this ratio moves following exogenous
changes in the two relevant forces in the economy. Predictions on the response of wage ratios can
always be reduced to predictions on local changes in inequality. The local change in inequality
describes how the wage ratio moves for two abilities similar enough, s0 and s00 > s0. The wage of
s00 is simply the wage of s0 plus the marginal price of skills: hence, the direction of the change in
this wage ratio can be determined by comparing two elasticities, the elasticity of the total price of
skills (i.e., the wage of s0) and the elasticity of the marginal price of skills (i.e., the slope of the
wage at s0). Suppose that the latter is more responsive than the former: then, an exogenous shock
that raises both the total and the marginal price of skills increases the ratio between the two wages
and increases local inequality.
What are the consequences of skill-biased technical change and trade integration on local in-
equality? The rst channel by assumption raises the value of every ability, but because of comple-
mentarities in production, managers with high ability gain disproportionately more than others;
on the other hand, the improvement in the overall e¢ ciency of the economy exerts a stronger
competitive pressure uniformly on all rms. With power law distributions for ideas and abilities,
the marginal price of skills is always more responsive than the total price of skills. For low levels
of abilities, they both decrease, but the former falls more, and local inequality decreases; for high
levels of abilities, they are both larger, but the former raises more, and local inequality increases.
Trade integration in the form of reduction of iceberg transport costs also benets rms asym-
metrically: while the domestic sellers must bear sti¤er competition from abroad, exporters face
lower costs to sell their products in the foreign market. This argument is standard in all trade
models with heterogeneous rms. I show that the marginal price of skills is again more sensitive,
and the same behavior of local changes in inequality is produced. In both cases, the level of wage
is less sensitive than the marginal wage because part of the adjustment on the level is borne by
prots.
I can then answer positively to the rst question because the wage ratio between two arbitrary
levels of ability can always be expressed as the sum of all the local changes occurring between them,
and these local change can have, in principle, any sign: if, for example, most of them are negative in
the region between the 10th and the 50th percentile of workers, the ratio p50=p10 will decrease, be
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it for episodes of skill-biased technical change or for larger intra-industry trade. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the rst paper which to provide a link between the empirically observed evolution
of wage ratios and a general equilibrium theory of the consequences of skill-biased technical change
and intra-industry trade.
If skill-biased technical change and trade integration can both rationalize the pattern for in-
equality in the U.S. economy that the literature has documented, what can help tell the two causes
apart? I focus on the intra-rm rent distribution, where I call "rent" the sum of prots and the
managers wage, less the opportunity cost of ideas and managers in the alternative occupation
(zero and the production worker wage, respectively). I show that the intra-rm rent distribution
is not modied by trade integration, which only a¤ects competitiveness and productivities across
rms. In equilibrium, in fact, the slope of the wage function (a marginal cost for the rm) must
reect the marginal benet of a better manager. In comparing two similar rms, then, the fraction
of the marginal rent captured by the better manager must be proportional to her contribution to
the creation of that rent. Since the trade costs inuence the marginal contribution of managers
and ideas in the same way, their relative contribution cannot be a function of trade integration.
Hence, changes in inequality not accompanied by change in the intra-rm rent distribution must be
attributed to trade. Vice-versa, changes in the intra-rm rent distribution must imply changes in
local inequality caused by skill-biased technical change. This is the rst paper to make a connection
between intra-rm rent distribution, and the consequences of intra-industry trade and skill-biased
technical change.
The paper is consistent with the patterns identied in the empirical literature on trade and rm-
level heterogeneity: exporting rms are larger, more productive, and earn higher prots; moreover,
I add to the current literature a simple channel through which larger rms also pay higher wages
(Oi and Idson (1999)), exporting rms employ higher quality of workers and pay higher wages than
rms only selling on the domestic market (see for example Bernard and Jensen, (1995), (1997),
(1999)).
The hypotheses of the model allow the arguments in this paper to dodge the most common
rejections of trade-based explanations for the evolution of inequality. Under the assumption that
trade shifts the derived demand of skilled workers across sectors, Berman, Bound and Griliches
(1994) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) argue that the observed pattern of wage ratios is only
consistent with skill-biased technical change6. On the other hand, Feenstra and Hanson (1996,
1999) nd a signicant role for international trade when they consider the import content of rms
intermediate inputs: a shift in demand away from unskilled and toward skilled workers within
sectors occurs when rms respond to competition from low-wage countries by outsourcing abroad
tasks intensive in unskilled labor. In any case, the common denominator of this debate is that
6This position is also supported by the fact that the increase in relative demand of skilled workers has been larger
where computing technology has spread faster (Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)).
In particular, computers are argued to be substitute for unskilled and complementary to skilled workers: hence,
rates of computer adoption should be correlated with rates of skill-upgrading across industries. Empirically, rates of
skill-upgrading within industries explain most of the increase in demand of college workers.
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trade ows are mainly driven by di¤erences in the price of factors across countries.
Although this channel has gained relevance in recent years with the rise of China and other
developing countries (see the discussion in Krugman (2008)), intra-industry trade has been very
important since long before7. I then analyze a progressive reduction of variable trasportation costs
between two perfectly identical economies. This focus shuts down by construction motives for
international trade based on relative di¤erences in factor endowments (as in the classic Heckscher-
Ohlin framework) and the associated distributional e¤ects based on di¤erences in relative factor
intensities across goods (Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects)8. Since trade ows are not generated by com-
parative advantage, rejections grounded on the reallocation of employment shares across sectors do
not apply to this framework.
The model is consistent with the mechanisms used by Gabaix and Landier (2008) to describe the
surge in CEO compensation in the last decades: this framework endogenizes the response of the size
distribution of rms to di¤erent exogenous shocks. Also, it shows that a divergent behavior in the
upper and lower tails of the wage distribution can be produced even when changes in the labor force
composition (Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005)) are absent. The elasticity of total and marginal
prices of skills are all that matter, and when one considers only data on the wage distribution, these
e¤ects are di¢ cult to disentangle.
This paper belongs to a series of recent studies which capitalize on rm-level heterogeneity
models (Manasse and Turrini (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz
and Yeaple (2005), Yeaple (2005), Chaney (2008)) and extend them enriching the details of the
human capital aspects.
The closest paper to this study is Costinot and Vogel (2009), who build a model of complemen-
tarities in production capable of addressing the consequences of technological change, North-North
and North-South trade on the wage function of heterogeneous workers. Their analysis has less
restrictive hypotheses, and allows for skill- and task-upgrading and downgrading, i.e., changes in
the assignment function between workers and tasks: in the present paper, this possibility is shut
down by the power law assumptions on the ideas and abilitiesdistribution. However, their model
has still no motive for trade between two identical countries. Moreover, the mass of goods (in their
model, tasks) is xed and there is no notion of selection into the home market. This result is driven
- compared to the present study - by the absence of an occupational choice of workers between
production and managerial activities: as a consequence, skill-biased technical change cannot then
produce a divergent pattern for wage ratios in di¤erent regions of the ability spectrum. Finally,
their model does not capture the well-documented selection of subsets of rms into the export
7For example, Baldwin and Martin (1999) document that two-thirds of contemporary world trade occurs among
rich countries with similar factor endowments, and three-fourths of this share is two-way trade within narrowly
dened industries. See also Helpman (1999), for a discussion. The rise in the share of trade in manufactured goods
with developing countries is not to be ignored, but is too recent to account for the evolution of inequality starting
the sixties. Moreover, an Hecksher-Ohlin-based explanation would predict a reduction in the skill premium in China,
which is counterfactual.
8A similar approach is undertaken in Epifani and Gancia (2008), who consider the case of two goods with di¤erent
skill intensity, homogeneous rms and no choice between skilled and unskilled occupations.
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market, and only compares autarky and free-trade equilibria when North-North trade is driven by
di¤erences in factor diversity9 across countries.
This paper is also related to Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2009). Their paper focuses on the
relation between trade, search and screening costs, and unemployment. Contrary to this model, it
features rms with many heterogeneous matches to workers that are ex-ante identical. However, the
consequences of skill-biased technical change are not addressed. Moreover, heterogeneity in wages
arises because labor market frictions give ex-ante identical workers a bargaining power within the
rm; changes in exogenous parameters of the model spur a reshu­ ing of the quality of the matches
that make impossible to track the outcome for specic workers. In this paper, heterogeneity in
wages is simply a consequence of assortative matching and of demand and supply at each skill
level, and it is persistent in response to exogenous shocks.
Also related to this study is Verhoogen (2008), who proposes a partial equilibrium framework
where wage inequality among heterogeneous workers in developing countries increases following
trade integration: the reason is that an increase in the demand for product quality raises the
demand of more skilled workers because of complementarities between input quality and output
quality. This mechanism limits its usefulness in discussing trade among identical countries.
I see the present study as complementary to this literature in the endevour to better under-
stand how international trade generates interdependence across labor market outcomes of di¤erent
countries.
In the rest of the paper, I will describe the model in closed economy (section 2) and provide a
motivation for the theoretical framework used in analyzing wage ratios, applying this to skill-biased
technical change (section 3). In section 4, I extend the model to an open economy framework, while
in section 5 I show how wage ratios respond to skill-biased techical change and trade integration.
Section 6 argues why the intra-rm rent distribution can help in disentangling the two causes,
skill-biased technical change and trade integration. Section 7 provides some conclusive remarks.
2 The Closed Economy
2.1 Consumers, Managers, and Ideas
The representative consumer maximizes a standard CES utility function where, from an innite
mass of varieties potentially available, a subset J of them is produced and aggregated as
Y =
Z
j2J
y (j)( 1)= dj
=( 1)
with   1: Standard optimization implies that each consumer will spend
x (j) =

p (j)
P
1 
X (2.1)
9Factor diversity captures the relative abundance of agents with extreme abilities, be them very low or very high.
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on each variety produced, where
P =
Z
j2J
p (j)1  dj
1=(1 )
is the ideal price index of good Y and X is total consumersexpenditure on it.
To x ideas, we think of di¤erent j as di¤erent varieties; however, I will interchangeably use
the term "rm", implicitly assuming one product per rm.
Three inputs are necessary for a production line to exists: an idea, a manager, and production
workers in proportion to output.
Varieties di¤er according to the status of the technology available for their production: denoting
with z 2 (0;1) the quality of an idea, I assume that there is a measure G (z) = Tz z (with z  1)
of ideas at least as good as z. This specication ensures that there is a su¢ cient number of ideas,
however bad, to accomodate any number of managers in equilibrium. Ideas are owned by a mutual
fund that maximizes prots and redistributes them equally across agents10.
The economy is populated by a mass L of agents, which, as in Lucas (1978), can be either
production workers or managers. Agents are heterogeneous in their mangerial ability, while they
all have a unit e¢ ciency as production workers. The ability s is also distributed according to a
power law: for s  1, there is a measure L (s) = Ls s (s  1) of potential managers with ability
of at least s. While in Lucas (1978) potential managers di¤er by their ability to run larger rms
producing a homogeneous nal product, here I assume that there are complementarities between
managerial ability and idea e¢ ciency. In particular, if production with an idea of e¢ ciency z is
run by a manager s, the total rms productivity is
' (z; s) = zs
with  > 0,  > 0.11 Note that by suitably redening units and parameters in the productivity,
we can always write the distribution of ability as having a shape parameter of 1, and still recover
the same distribution for s, which is what matters for the productivity of the rm; the same is
true for the parameter z on the distribution of idease¢ ciency. The parameters s and z will
then be set to 1 without loss of generality12. The parameter  uniquely measures the inuence of
managersability: while  = 0 reduces this model to a simple one-sided heterogeneity framework,
10The assumption of equal redistribution is immaterial to the rest of the paper, since I am only interested in wage
(rather than income) distribution. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) discuss relative merits of these two alternatives.
11This assumption satises log-supermodularity as in Costinot (2007).
12More precisely, suppose that G (z) = Tz z ; in this case, the distribution of z satises T Pr fz > ag = Ta z=.
We want to show that there are a ~z and ~ such that the measure of ideas ~z better than any value a is Ta 1 and
that still assigns to ~z~ the same distribution that z has. Let ~z  zz , and ~ = =z. Hence, the measure of ideas
~z better than a is T Pr f~z > ag = T Przz > a	 = Ta 1: ~z has a distribution with shape parameter 1. Moreover,
T Pr

~z~ > a
	
= T Pr
n
~z > az=
o
= T

az=
 1
which is then equal to the distribution of z. An analogous
argument, with ~s  ss and ~ = =s, establishes the equivalence for the population of managers. Finally, since z
and s have the same distribution as ~z~ and ~s~, it must also be true that the product of these two variables, ~z~~s~,
has the same distribution as zs.
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increasing  lets a rm gain from a better manager. Moreover, there is a simple mapping between
abilities and percentiles in the skill and wage distributions: the ability s is always collocated at the
100(1  s 1)th percentile.
Agents who choose to be production workers earn a wage w, which is then also the opportunity
cost of being a manager. This wage is the numeraire and will be normalized to 1; I leave it here
explicitly for clarity. When y units of good are to be produced, y=' e¢ ciency units of work from
production workers are used at a cost of wy=' in total. Denote as:
v (p;')  x (p)  wx (p)
p'
the surplus of the rm with overall productivity ', i.e. the excess of revenues over costs for
production workers, when the price p is chosen. For any manager s, a rm with idea quality z sets
a price which solves
 (z; s)  max
p
v (p;' (z; s))
implying
p (') =

   1
w
'
) p (z; s) = 
   1
w
zs
(2.2)
For any given quality z, the optimal price is then a function of the quality of the manager s the
owner of z chooses. The way in which the market balances incentives across rms is the subject of
the next section.
2.2 Assignment
Substituting the revenue function (2.1) and the optimal price (2.2) in the expression for v (p;'),
the surplus for a rm (z; s) is rewritten as
v (z; s) = M

zs
w
 1
(2.3)
M  1



   1
1 
XP  1
The term M is a measure of the economically relevant size of the market. A larger expenditure
level X, or weaker competition through higher average price P all make the market bigger and
tend to raise the surplus for any rm.
This surplus must cover payments to the manager of ability s, residually determining prots for
the idea z. The complementarity between managers and ideas - which drives the incentive to positive
assortative matching - is manifest in the cross derivative of the surplus v1;2 (z; s) being positive: a
marginal increase in the quality of ideas always enhances the total net value of production, but this
enhancement is larger when the manager running the rm is better. This complementarity creates
an incentive for better rms to hire better managers, or equivalently, for more able managers to
choose better rms. The assignment between managers and rms is non-random. The ideasowner
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problem is then
 (z) = max
s2[1;1)
fv (z; s)  w (s)g
Following Sattinger (1979), I assume that a rm is unable to a¤ect the prevailing market
conditions, so that the wage function is taken as given: the optimal ability s will be chosen to
balance the marginal benet of a better manager (higher productivity and larger surplus available
for distribution) with the marginal costs of it (higher wage demanded). In an optimum,
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s) = w0 (s) (2.4)
gives a condition that can be used to trace out the wage function when the left hand side is evaluated
at the idea quality z which chooses s optimally, i.e., at z = z (s).
To build the equilibrium wage function, I will then proceed under the tentative assumption of
positive assortative matching, z0 (s) > 0, and prove that this must be true in equilibrium because
of complementarities in production. If the best managers work running rms with the best ideas,
the assignment problem will imply (matching the measures at the right tail of the distributions)
that Tz 1 = Ls 1, or
z = ts, s = z=t, with t  T=L (2.5)
under our assumptions. The parameter t, which we take as exogenous, is a measure of relative
size of technology available in the country. A larger population size increases the availability of
managers at all levels of ability, so that any idea z is matched with a better s; any potential manager
gets hurt by a larger L, though, since this increases the mass of people better than her13.
Di¤erentiating then the surplus (2.3) with respect to s, plugging z (s) from (2.5) in it, and
substituting the resulting v2 (z (s) ; s) in (2.4) we obtain
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s)  (   1)M

t
w
 1
s(+)( 1) 1 = w0 (s)
This equation gives the equilibrium marginal rent for managers of di¤erent ability: its elasticity
to di¤erent stimuli will play a crucial role in determining how inequality responds. Integrating
over s, and using the fact that the marginal manager - denote her sc - must be indi¤erent between
occupations, we get:
w (s) =
Z s
sc
v2 (z; s)jz=z(s) ds =
=

+ 

t
w
 1
M

s(+)( 1)   s(+)( 1)c

+ w (2.6)
and with w (s) = w below sc.
The prot function  (z) must then be the di¤erence between the surplus and the wage, and
13To parallel the terminology of Costinot and Vogel (2008), this would be skill-upgrading from the standpoint of
the rm, and rm-downgrading (which they call task-downgrading) from the point of view of a manager.
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leaves the marginal idea zc indi¤erent to the alternative of not being used. To nd the equilibrium
prot value, I use the optimal assignment function (2.5) and (2.6), and the fact that marginal idea
zc must have zero prots, to get
 (z) = v (z; s (z))  w (s (z)) =
=

+ 

t 
w
 1
M

z(+)( 1)   z(+)( 1)c

(2.7)
with  (z) = 0 below zc14.
The su¢ cient condition for an optimum will require, when looking at the choice of manager
z, that v22 (z; s)   w00 (s) < 0 when z = z (s) (i.e., along the optimal assignment), which can
be easily shown to be true by di¤erentiating (2.4) again with respect to s, and then plugging in
the assignment function: the complementarity assumption v12 (z; s (z)) > 0 ensures that positive
assortative matching emerges as an equilibrium outcome15.
The equilibrium assignment of managers to rms provides a simple microfoundation for the rent
sharing between managers and ideas within a rm, based on local scarcity of talents vs. ideasand
their contributions to the total productivity of the rm. The rent to be shared is v (s ; z (s))   w,
the excess of surplus over the sum of managers and ideasopportunity cost ( w and 0 respectively).
The share of this rent going to managerswages is
  
+ 
If managers do not inuence the rms e¢ ciency ( = 0), the rent for talent is zero, the
equilibrium wage function reduces to the outside option, and we are back to the standard one-sided
heterogeneity case similar to Melitz (2003), where workerscontributions are homogeneous and the
wage per e¢ ciency unit is at across ability levels. On the other hand, if  = 0 we recover a
model similar to Lucas (1978) and Manasse and Turrini (2001), where heterogeneous workers are
operating using homogeneous ideas: prots then are zero, and only a non-trivial wage function
remains.
If complementarities exist in production, the distribution of each factor determines both the
rent-sharing and the nal productivity distribution of rms; in other words, making assumptions on
14This is not the only way to characterize the earning functions. Since the problem is symmetric in managers
and ideas, we could have started with the managers taking as given the prot function  (z) and choosing ideas.
Alternatively, we could have had each side choosing the other (as Sattinger (1979)), particularizing each constant of
integration with the relevant outside option.
15The second order condition for the optimality of s in the rm problem requires v22 (z; s)  w00 (s) < 0. Di¤eren-
tiating (2.4) again with respect to s we get w00 (s) = v22 (z; s) + v12 (z; s) z0 (s), which implies w00 (z)   v22 (z; s) =
v12 (z; s) z
0 (s). Using (2.3), we have
v12 (z; s) =
1



   1
1 
XP 1 (   1) (   1) z( 1) 1s( 1) 1 > 0
so that, v22 (z; s)  w00 (s) < 0 , v12 (z; s) z0 (s) > 0, s0 (z) > 0.
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both the productivity distribution of rms and rent sharing is equivalent to making a statement on
the degree of heterogeneity of each factor. Observationally, this framework provides a link between
rm size distribution and the share of rent which goes to each factor type.
For some purposes, one could go further, simply assuming a rm-level heterogeneity in ' and
an ad-hoc rent splitting in constant shares. Such an approach would sidestep the description of
the market mechanism underlying the assignment problem, at the cost of obscuring its economic
content. For the purpose of this study, however, we cannot simply assume an exogenous rm-level
productivity distribution and arbitrary rent-sharing proportions. As I will argue below, a proper
way to think about skill-biased technical change is to keep xed the distribution of managers
ability, while changing the e¤ective distribution of idea quality through increases in . When this
happens, not only does the share of rents to managers decrease, but the overall rm productivity
distribution improves: studying the e¤ect of a change in the share parameter we would miss the
second part, while only studying an increase in the rm-level heterogeneity parameter we would
ignore the former.
2.3 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium in a closed economy, it is su¢ cient to determine the cuto¤ sc for
managers ability and the expenditure level X in the economy. Note rst that using the price
index denition, the individual rm price (2.2) and the assignment function (2.5), and assuming
(+ ) (   1) < 1, the price index has the form
P =

   1 w

 
L
1=( 1)
t s =( 1)c (2.8)
with
  1  (   1) (+ ) 2 (0; 1) (2.9)
where the assumption (+ ) (   1) < 1 is needed to ensure that the joint knowledge embodied
in ideas and people never implies the existence of a few rms e¢ cient enough to bring down the
price index P to zero. Note that a larger relative measure of technology t reduces the price of the
nal good aggregate Y .
The expenditure on production workers for each rm is x (')  v (') ; using the expression for
revenues (2.1), surplus (2.3), the assignment function (2.5) and the price index (2.8), and integrating
over all active rms, we get that the overall expenditure on production workers is  1 X:
On the supply side, when sc is the managerscuto¤, L
 
1  s 1c

e¢ ciency units are provided for
production. Equating total wages of production workers to total expenditure over them by rms,
we get
X =

   1L w
 
1  s 1c

(2.10)
This curve describes an equilibrium relation in the labor market. When sc ! 1, total earnings of
production workers are zero, and so must be the expenditure X, while as sc ! 1, all agents are
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Xcs
Zero Cutoff Earnings
Labor Market Equilibrium
Figure 2.1: This gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ sc and the expenditure level X
in closed economy. The labor market equilibrium represents the locus of pairs (sc; X) where expenditure
over and income of production workers are equalized; the zero cuto¤ earnings is the locus of points where
the surplus of the marginal rm (sc; z (sc)) exactly covers the sum of outside options, so that there is
no incentive for entry or exit in the di¤erentiated sector.
employed as production workers, and total expenditure on them approaches a nite constant; the
monotonic increase in sc is inherited by the properties of the CDF.
In addition to production labor market clearing, we need to make sure that the rm (sc; z (sc))
is made up by factors indi¤erent between production of varieties in Y and their alternative em-
ployment. This condition requires the surplus function (2.3) to be equal to the sum of the outside
options for the indi¤erent pair of agents; using the assignment relation (2.5) and the price index
(2.8),
X =

 
L ws 1c (2.11)
This equation is a "zero cuto¤ earnings" condition. As sc ! 1 the right-hand side becomes a strictly
positive and nite number, while as sc grows toward innity, this curve goes to zero. Hence, as
shown in Figure 2.1, the equilibrium (sc; X) is always uniquely determined.
The simple functional form assumed allows to solve explicitly for sc in terms of parameters:
equating (2.10) and (2.11), and using the denition (2.9) for  , we have
sc = 1 +
(   1)
1  (   1) (+ ) (2.12)
X =

 +    1L (2.13)
where we note that the equilibrium cuto¤ is only a function of the sum of contributions of ideas
and managers.
Having established the equilibrium conditions, we can also rewrite the earning functions in more
explicit terms. Using the assignment function (2.5) to express the surplus (2.3) in terms of s, and
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imposing equality to w for the marginal rm, we have that
M = wt ( 1)s (+)( 1)c = w
t( 1)z (+)( 1)c
Substituting the LHS out in the expressions for wages (2.6) and prots (2.7), we can rewrite them
as
w (s) = 
"
s
sc
(+)( 1)
  1
#
w + w (2.14)
 (z) = (1  )
"
z
zc
(+)( 1)
  1
#
w (2.15)
Using the expression for sc in (2.12) in the price index (2.8), we can express the prot and wage
function above the cuto¤ in real terms only as a function of parameters, as  (z) =P and w (s) =P
above the cuto¤s, and 0 and P 1 below, respectively.
The equilibrium wage function is then determined jointly by the distribution of abilities and
technology through a market mechanism which prices the relative scarcity of each type of agent.
The structure of the real earning functions has some characteristic elements.
The inverse of the price index gives a measure of the opportunity cost of keeping agents employed
as production workers: in fact, their real wage is exactly P 1, after normalizing w to 1.
The parameter  represents a talent-specic component: total real rents in the rm
h
(s=sc)
1    1
i
=P
are split giving a share  to managers and a share 1   to ideas. For example, if  = 0, managers
do not contribute to the overall productivity distribution, and the share of rents going to managers
is zero, and the wage reduces to w for all abilities.
A microeconomic component, s=sc and z=zc, determines then income di¤erences between dif-
ferent levels of ability within managers, and within ideas.
In the next section, I use this framework to evaluate the consequences of skill-biased technical
change on the wage ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the wage distribution.
3 Skill-Biased Technical Change
This section analyzes the e¤ect of skill-biased technical change on an arbitrary wage ratio in a
closed economy. Before focusing on the substantive side of the issue, I provide a general motivation
for the theoretical framework used in analyzing the e¤ect of skill-biased technical change on wage
ratios. This discussion will also apply to the analysis of the open economy.
I dene skill-biased technical change as a change in technology which benets disproportionately
highly skilled managers. I model skill-biased technical change as an exogenous increase in , and
do not attempt to explain the source of this increase. This assumption implies that the percent
increase in productivity is biased toward rms which employ better managers: for a given ability
s, the elasticity of the productivity of the rm ts(+) to  is simply  ln ts, which is increasing
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in s16. This is the only way in which, in this model, skill-biased technical change can be modeled.
An increase in  would amount to a change in the distribution of abilities, which instead we want
to keep xed. An increase in productivity proportional to all rms, say from sz to sz, with
 > 1; is equivalent to an increase in the e¢ ciency of production workers, and would not be skill
biased: the elasticity of the productivity to  is 1 for all rms17.
This discussion also makes clear why we need a market mechanism and two distributions of
heterogeneous agents, rather than an exogenous rent splitting between them: we think of skill-
biased technical change as a¤ecting a xed ability distribution, which implies both an improvement
in the assignment and a change in the overall distribution of productivities. A change in the
rent-splitting parameter would ignore the latter aspect.
Empirically, the skill-biased technical change hypothesis is rooted in a positive correlation be-
tween adoption of computer-based technologies, skill-upgrading, and rising wage premia for educa-
tion within and across rms and industries (see Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) for a discussion
and further references, and Card and DiNardo (2002) for a critique). This hypothesis has also
been rationalized arguing that it impacts asymmetrically routine and non-routine tasks, thereby
providing testable implications on the composition and shifts of job tasks over time (Autor, Levy
and Murnane (2003)). My formulation captures these arguments in a simple model.
Since the distribution of abilities is xed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between any
ability level s and a percentile in the wage distribution, 100(1  s 1). The analysis can then focus
on the elasticity to  of w (s00) =w (s0), with s00 > s0. Consider rst two agents with very similar
levels of ability. The di¤erence in their wage is essentially the marginal price of skills at s0, so
that the wage ratio is just 1 + ws (s0) =w (s0). When the marginal price of skills is more elastic to
 than is the wage, skill-biased technical change increases the premium for the ability di¤erence
ws (s
0) proportionally more than the price of ability w (s0) (i.e., the wage at s0). The wage ratio
w (s00) =w (s0), which in this case is a measure of local inequality, increases.
More generally, the change in the wage ratio between two ability levels s0 and s00 can always be
thought of as the "sum" of all the local changes intervening between them. The formal argument
(relegated to Appendix A.1) shows that the local change in inequality at s when  changes is
() (s)  ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
(3.1)
where w (s) = @w (s) =@ and ws (s) = @2w (s) = (@@s). The function () (s) is the di¤erence
between the elasticity of the marginal price of skills and the elasticity of the total price of skills.
For two ability levels s0 and s00, with s00 > s0, the elasticity of the wage ratio w (s00) =w (s0) to  is
16For example, at t =  = 1 a 1% increase in  raises the productivity of a rm employing a top 10% manager by
1.61 percentage points more than the median rm (in fact, ln (s00=s0) = ln (10=2) = 1:61).
17 In fact, it is as if to produce y units of goods, we move from a requirement of y=' to a requirement of y= (')
e¢ ciency units of unskilled labor. Note also that the same argument applies to proportional changes of z: if we
assume that the productivity is s (z) and then increase , this is still equivalent to a proportional increase in the
e¢ ciency of production workers of .
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simply Z s00
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s) ds
The total change in inequality between s0 and s00 is the integral of the local changes in inequality,
weighted by ws (s) =w (s), a positive and unitless measure of the importance of ability di¤erences.
When for some s, () (s) > 0, the local contribution of s is to increase all the wage ratios that
contain it, and vice-versa.
Any argument about the behavior of wage dispersion is essentially a specication of eq. (3.1);
the framework here proposed simply provides one. I now examine in detail how skill-biased technical
change a¤ects () (s).
3.1 Skill-Biased Technical Change and Wage Ratios
At the economy-wide level, skill-biased technical change raises the contribution of ideas to the
productivity of all rms. However, any rm, holding constant its productivity, faces now a sti¤er
competition for its product. If sc is the indi¤erent manager at expenditure level Xc, eq. (2.11)
shows that a larger expenditure is necessary for her to stay in the managerial occupation: the
Zero Cuto¤ Earnings curve in Figure 2.1 shifts up. Since the market for production workers is
not directly a¤ected by this change, selection is stricter among managers: the worst white collar
managers become blue collar.
Having described how  a¤ects exit from the di¤erentiated sector, I can characterize the behavior
of the local change in inequality.
The elasticity of the wage to  (the second term in (3.1)) is determined by the interaction of
three e¤ects. Eq. (2.14) shows that an increase in  a¤ects the wage through (i) the change in the
share of rents  going to managers, (ii) the e¤ect of selection, and (iii) the e¤ect of assignment18.
The rst term captures a negative "share" e¤ect: for a xed rent level in the rm, the share of
it going to managers decreases, because technology now contributes more overall to di¤erences in
rm-level productivities. The second term captures a negative "selection" e¤ect: since the rent
level is just the integral of the marginal rents from the worst rm upwards, when the worst agent
select out of the market (we already saw that @sc=@ > 0) the total rent decreases. The third
term represents an "assignment" e¤ect, and is always positive: any manager gains from a larger
contribution of z to the productivity of the rm; since the change is biased towards better agents,
the assignment will grow in importance as s grows.
The elasticity to  of the marginal price of skill ws (s) (the rst term in (3.1)), on the other
hand, is not directly inuenced by the share of rents going to managers, since  is a¤ecting in the
same proportion both ws (s) and its change when  increases: the share e¤ect is absent. However,
skill-biased technical change tends to reduce the elasticity to  of the marginal price of skills through
selection, and to increase it through assignment. Simple calculations show that () (s) is positive
18The e¤ect of  on the opportunity cost, which goes through real wages, is always canceled because we are
considering wage ratios, so that [w (s00) =P ] = [w (s0) =P ] = w (s00) =w (s0).
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if and only if
ws (s)
ws (s)
>
w (s)
w (s)
,
 (1   )
sc
@sc
@| {z }
Selection
+ (   1) ln s
sc| {z }
Assignment
>  g1 (s) (1  )| {z }
Share
  g2 (s) (1   )
sc
@sc
@| {z }
Selection
+ g2 (s) (   1) ln s
sc| {z }
Assignment
where
g1 (s)  w (s)  1
w (s)
2 (0; 1) , g2 (s)  w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
2 (; 1) (3.2)
and g0i (s) > 0 for i = 1; 2.
For managers bad enough, the assignment and share e¤ects are negligible, and the negative
selection e¤ect dominates. Its impact is greater (more negative) on the marginal price of skills:
the selection e¤ect determines the wage elasticity only to the extent managers participate to the
creation of surplus (in fact, g2 (s) ! 0 as  ! 0). Overall, the marginal price of skills falls
proportionately more than the wage, so that the wage ratio between two close managers becomes
smaller: the change in local inequality is negative.
For good enough managers, the assignment e¤ects dominates the other two, but again, only a
fraction g2 (s) of it impacts the elasticity of the wage. Hence, for abilities high enough, skill-biased
technical change increases the marginal price of skills proportionately more than the wage: for two
close managers the ratio of wages will then increase, and the contribution of local inequality will
be positive.
Note also that if the selection e¤ect is close to zero, the region with negative local change in
inequality tends to vanish, which means that selection is necessary for the inequality to decrease
among bad managers.
Proposition 1 (proven in Appendix A.2) formally states this result:
Proposition 1. There exists a unique skill level s() > sc such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
With these results in hand, it is possible to rationalize a divergent pattern in the percentile
ratio for high vs. low ability agents (as in Autor, Katz and Kearney 2005) and an increasing
dispersion in the tails (as in Piketty and Saez 2004) only in terms of skill-biased technical change.
The latter is already evident: local inequality increases for all s > s(), and the percentile ratio will
increase at any pair of points in the ability distribution above the threshold, and in particular, at
very high percentiles in the tail. To rationalize the former, it is su¢ cient to note that we can pick
s0 < s00 < sc, and s000 > s() to produce a constant ratio in the lower part of the income distribution
(w (s00) =w (s0)) and an increasing ratio in the upper part (w (s000) =w (s00)); or, sc < s0 < s00 < s()
in the lower part and s000 > s() to obtain one decreasing and one increasing wage ratio at di¤erent
percentiles in the distribution.
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4 The Open Economy
I now introduce the framework and show the equilibrium determination when 2 identical countries
are allowed to trade with each other. Assuming identical countries is appropriate since we want
to think of intra-industry trade as a source of inequality, and to do so it is necessary to neutralize
di¤erences in factor endowments or technologies.
In what follows, I lay out the main modication to the framework in an open economy; then I
show how the equilibrium is determined.
4.1 Framework
I assume that a rm needs to produce  units of a good for 1 unit to reach the foreign destination,
and that f units of production workers are needed to sell in the export market. If the price of rm
' is p (') in the domestic market, it will be p (') abroad. The surplus from sales on the domestic
and export markets are given respectively by:
vd (z; s) = M

zs
w
 1
(4.1)
vx (z; s) = 
1 M

zs
w
 1
  f w (4.2)
where vi, with i = d; x; indicates the surplus reaped by a rm selling in the domestic and in the
export market, respectively, and M  1


 1
1 
XP  1.
The earning functions corresponding to equations (2.6) and (2.7) are built following steps anal-
ogous to the closed economy. The only di¤erence is that the optimality condition (2.4) will depend
on the export status of the rm. Since this is not known in advance, I postulate the existence of the
two cuto¤s sd and sx, and then build separately two sets of rst order conditions, for rms selling
only to the domestic market (which earn vd (z; s)) and for rms selling to both markets (which earn
vd (z; s) + vx (z; s)). Having obtained two expressions for wd (s) and wx (s), I impose two separate
indi¤erence conditions, wd (sd) = w and wx (sx) = wd (sx), to actually pin down sd and sx.
Following these steps, simple calculations deliver the earning functions in each country:
 (z) =
8<: (1  )

t 
w
 1
M

z1    z1  d

z 2 [zd; zx)
(1  )

t 
w
 1
M
h
z1    z1  d

+ 1 

z1    z1  x
i
z  zx
(4.3)
w (s) =
8<: 
 
t
w
 1
M

s1    s1  d

+ w s 2 [sd; sx)

 
t
w
 1
M
h
s1    s1  d

+ 1 

s1    s1  x
i
+ w s  sx
(4.4)
To connect the selection of domestic and foreign sellers, I set the surplus in (4.1) and (4.2) to
w and 0, respectively, to characterize sd and sx; substituting the assignment function (2.5), solving
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both expressions for M and equating them,
sx =
 
 1f
1=(1  )
sd (4.5)
where I assume that
 
 1f
1=(1  )
> 1 in order to generate the empirically relevant pattern of
partitioning in the export behavior of rms, i.e., sx > sd.
This equation allows us to write the price index as a simple function of the domestic cuto¤. In
fact, since
P =

   1 
1=( 1)
h
Lt( 1) w1 s  d + 
1 Lt( 1) w1 s  x
i1=(1 )
we can use (4.5) to eliminate s  x and get:
P =

   1 w

 
L
1=( 1)
t 

1 +
1

 1=( 1)
s
 =( 1)
d (4.6)
  1=(+)f =(1  ) (4.7)
where  is an index of distance between the two economies. While the general structure of the price
index reects its shape in closed economy (eq. (2.8)), the additional term (1 + 1=) 1=( 1) shows
how competition from abroad lowers the price index at home. In particular, note that heterogeneity
in both skill and technology contribute to e¤ectively reduce the distance between the two countries
(as  +  grows,  becomes smaller). The relative size of ideas vs. population t lowers the price
index only in proportion to the importance of the assignment: as ! 0, ideas play no role in the
productivity, sorting is immaterial, and t no longer a¤ects P .
4.2 Equilibrium
In an open economy, equilibrium will require for each country: (i) indi¤erence for the marginal
agent sd between alternative occupation, (ii) equilibrium in the market for production workers,
and (iii) trade balance.
The indi¤erence of a rm to sell on the domestic market or shut down (condition (i)) simply
requires the surplus in the domestic market given in (4.1) to be equal to the sum of the outside
options w and 0 when evaluated at sd and zd  tsd: Substituting in such equality the expression
for the price index (4.6), using (4.5) and rearranging, we get
X =

 
L w

1 +
1


s 1d (4.8)
This equation is the open economy equivalent of (2.11), the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings: it shows how
competition from abroad a¤ects occupational choices. Stronger trade integration (lower ) makes
competition sti¤er, lowering the price index and increasing the real wage for production workers:
at any expenditure level X, the cuto¤ agent sd must be better to compete in her own market.
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Equating total income of production workers to total expenditure of rms on them (condition
(ii)) we obtain
L w
 
1  s 1d

=
   1

X + f wLs 1x (4.9)
The right-hand side of this expression is found integrating separately labor demand for domestic
and export sales, and including the xed requirement to sell abroad, f w, in proportion to the mass
of exporters Ls 1x . Substituting (4.5) into (4.9) and rearranging,
X =

   1L w

1 

1 +
1


s 1d

(4.10)
Equation (4.10) is the parallel in an open economy of eq. (2.10), the Labor Market Clearing
condition: it shows how the possibility to sell abroad a¤ects domestic demand of production workers.
As economies become more integrated, more workers are demanded to pay the xed costs of export
( decreases), and a lower level of overall expenditure X is needed to equilibrate demand and supply
of production workers.
To close the model, we need to make sure that these conditions are compatible in the world
economy: if trade balance has to be satised (condition (iii)), this entails a relation between the
relative wage of production workers in the two economies. When countries are identical, this ratio
is simply 1.
Equations (4.8) and (4.10) pin down the 2 endogenous variables of this model, the national
income X and the domestic cuto¤s sd: The exporter cuto¤ sx can then be found using (4.5), and
the price indicex using (4.6). Equating (4.8) and (4.10) and solving for sd, we obtain
sd =

1 +
   1
1  (   1) (+ )

1 +
1


(4.11)
Substituting this value back in (4.8), I obtain
X =

 +    1L w (4.12)
Figure 4.1 shows graphically how the equilibrium is determined.
In equilibrium, the market size M can be written, using the assignment function (2.5) in the
surplus (4.1) and imposing equality to w, as
M = wt ( 1)s (+)( 1)d = w
t( 1)z (+)( 1)d
We can use this expression and the equation (4.5) to substitute outM and the exporterscuto¤s
in the prot and wage functions (4.3) and (4.4), to obtain
 (z) =
8>><>>:
(1  )

z
zd
1    1 z 2 [zd; zx)
(1  )
 
1 + 1 
 
z
zd
1    (1 + f) z  zx (4.13)
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 X
ds
Zero Cutoff Earnings
Labor Market Equilibrium
Closed Economy
Open Economy
Figure 4.1: This gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ sd and the expenditure level
X in an open economy. The possibility to sell abroad implies that a lower level of expenditure (for any
supply of production workers) is su¢ cient for equilibrium, so that the Labor Market Equilibrium curve
shifts down and to the right. On the other hand, competition from abroad implies that the marginal
rm must employ a better manager (at any level of domestic expenditure) to stay indi¤erent when trade
is allowed, and the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings curve shifts up and to the right. As a result, the cuto¤ for
domestic producers is larger in open economy.
and
w (s) =
8>><>>:


s
sd
1    1+ 1 s 2 [sd; sx)

 
1 + 1 
 
s
sd
1    (1 + f)+ 1 s  sd (4.14)
The real earnings can easily be obtained dividing by the price index (4.6). Below the cuto¤s,
we still have  (z) =P = 0 and w (s) =P = P 1.
All the components identied in the closed economy case are present, suitably modied, in the
open economy. The macro-economic component, P 1, and the type-specic component  enter in a
similar way. The existence of an export market now raises the marginal price of skills for managers
good enough to access it.
In the next section, I use this model to compare the consequences of skill-biased technical change
and trade integration on wages ratios in di¤erent regions of the income distribution.
5 Implications for Wage Dispersion
As discussed in the Introduction, the recent evolution of the wage distribution can be characterized
by a divergent pattern for wage ratios in the lower vs. the upper tail, and an increase in the
dispersion on the right tail of the wage distribution. I now ask if, for given contribution of managers
 to the productivity of the rm, trade integration and skill-biased technical change can both
rationalize this pattern. I will prove that this is indeed the case, and in the process I will show
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that - even in this highly stylized model - it is possible to have trade integration reducing the local
inequality at all levels of ability, and techical change exhibiting a quite complex pattern of local
changes: this fact emphasizes the necessity of being explicit about the interaction of skill-biased
technical change and openness.
5.1 Skill-Biased Technical Change and Inequality
The basic components determining the direction of the local change in inequality (see eq. (3.1))
are unaltered when countries are allowed to trade: we still have to compare the elasticity of the
marginal price of skill to the elasticity of the wage with respect to a change in . The di¤erence
lies in the latter term, which varies according to the export status. In particular, denoting gi2 (s)
the weight on selection and assignment e¤ects for domestic sellers (i = d) and exporters (i = x),
the local change in inequality is positive if and only if
 (1   )
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
+ (   1) ln s
sd| {z }
Assignment
>   g1 (s) (1  )| {z }
Share
  gi2 (s)
(1   )
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
+ gi2 (s) (   1) ln
s
sd| {z }
Assignment
where
gd2 (s) 
w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
, for s 2 (sd; sx) (5.1)
gx2 (s) 
w (s)  [1   (1 + f)]
w (s)
; for s  sx (5.2)
and g1 (s)  (w (s)  1) =w (s), as in (3.2). The analysis of each of these terms exactly mirrors the
discussion in the closed economy section.
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills (left-hand side) is una¤ected by the export status.
Conditional on exporting (i = x), the elasticity of the wage to  (right-hand side) now incorporates
the additional xed cost necessary to sell abroad. A larger xed cost tends to reduce the level of
skill rent (see eq. (4.14)) and hence to increase the percentage impact of any given change in 
on w (s). For this reason, the selection and assignment e¤ects receive a larger weight for exporters
than for domestic sellers, i.e., gx2 (s) > g
d
2 (sx) 8s  sx. The share e¤ect, operating on a given rent,
is not changed.
Note that while gd2 (s) 2 (; 1) always, xed costs can be large enough (i.e., 1    (1 + f) < 0,
which is true if and only if f > =) to imply gx2 (s) > 1. In this case, the selection and the
assignment e¤ect are stronger on the elasticity of the wage to  (right-hand side) than on the
elasticity of the marginal price of skills (left-hand side). In order to answer the question of this
paper, whether or not the observed behavior on wage ratios can be rationalized both by skill-biased
technical change and trade integration, it is su¢ cient to focus on the case in which gx2 (s) < 1. I
will maintain this restriction throughout the rest of the paper, although I will briey discuss what
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happens when it is not satised19.
Assumption 1. Fixed costs of exporting are such that f < =.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique skill level s() > sd such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
This proposition (proven in Appendix A.3) generalizes Proposition 1 to an open economy.
Whether the threshold s() is larger or smaller than the threshold for exporters sx depends on the
values of the parameters of the model. In the Proof, I show that along a path of trade integration
(from  ! 1 to  ! 1) it is possible to have a positive local change in inequality (i) for all
exporters and the best domestic sellers ( s() 2 (sd; sx)), (ii) only for all exporters (s() = sx)20,
and nally (iii) only for the best exporters (s() > sx).
When Assumption 1 is not satised (f < =), the assignment and selection e¤ects are propor-
tionally more important on the level of the wage than on the marginal wage. In this case, it is still
true that for the worst domestic sellers local inequality decreases, while it increases for the best
exporters. However, it is possible to show that the threshold is no longer necessarily unique: we can
have two ability levels s(;d) and s(;x), for domestic sellers and exporters respectively, above which
local inequality increases, and below which it decreases. This is a case where (i) the best domestic
sellers are good enough for the assignment e¤ect to overcome the other two: as  increases, the the
total price of skills is less sensitive than the marginal price, and the local change in inequality is
positive; and (ii) at the same time, for some of the worst exporters xed costs are high enough to
make the total price of skills more sensitive to  than the marginal price: for them the local change
in inequality is negative21.
5.2 Trade Integration and Inequality
In this section I adapt the conceptual framework introduced above to evaluate the e¤ect of trade
integration on the evolution of wage ratios. In this experiment, I will model trade integration as
reduction in the proportional transportation cost  . Following steps analogous to what we did
before to analyze episodes of skill-biased technical change (as in Appendix A.1), we can then write
19At aggregate level, Assumption 1 is placing a lower bound on the ratio between rents to ideas and rent to
managers. Total rents for managers (wages less opportunity costs) can be written as W = 	  Ls 1d , and prots
(i.e., ideasrents) as  = 	 L (1  ) s 1d , where 	  	h+	f are two parameter aggregates coming from home and
foreing market rents; in particular, 	h = [1=   1], and 	f =
 
1 + 1 

=   (1 + f) 1 =f   1f  =(1  ).
Hence, =W = =.
20 In particular, there is a non-trivial interval of values for  where this state occurs: in other words, s() = sx is
not a knife-edge case (see Proof of Proposition 2).
21Since a complete taxonomy of the cases is not the objective of this paper, and divergent patterns of percentile
ratios can be obtained even if f < =, I will focus on cases where this restriction holds. Also, note that even if
f > =, we think of falling trade costs and skill-biased technical change as important facts in the major industrialized
countries in recent decades. Hence, this inequality would tend to be reversed by declines in f and increases in .
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the total change in inequality following trade integration between ability s0 and s00 > s0 as
() (s) =
ws (s) 
ws (s)
  w (s) 
w (s)
where () (s) measures the local change in inequality at ability level s, w (s) = @w (s) =@ and
ws (s) = @
2w (s) = (@@s). The local change in inequality is then proportional to the di¤erence
between the elasticity to  of the marginal price of skills and the total price of skills. The change
in the wage ratio between s0 and s00, which can be written asZ s00
s0
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s) ds
is positive when trade costs fall if @@ [w (s
00) =w (s0)] < 0, so that now () (s) < 0 goes in the
direction of increasing local inequality.
Trade integration is a¤ecting wages through two channels, (i) the reduced marginal cost that
exporters face in order to sell abroad, and (ii) higher competition at home, which tends to reduce
revenues on the domestic market and select some managers out of the di¤erentiated sector.
For non-exporters, the selection e¤ect is the only channel active when trade integration occurs.
Using (4.14), simple calculations show that
ws (s) 
ws (s)

s<sx
>
w (s) 
w (s)

s<sx
,
 (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
>  gd2 (s) (1   )

sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
, () (s) > 0
with gd2 given in (5.1). As  falls, both the wage and the marginal price of skill decrease. However,
the marginal price is more responsive (it drops more), since the elasticity of the wage level is
reduced by the fact that managers are not getting all the surplus (and in fact, gd2 (s) < 1): part of
the adjustment will occur through prots. Hence, as trade integration occurs, () (s) is positive,
and local inequality decreases for all non-exporting managers.
For exporters, di¤erentiation of (4.14) delivers
ws (s) 
ws (s)

ssx
<
w (s) 
w (s)

ssx
,
  (   1)
 1 + 1| {z }
Price
  (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
<   (s=sd)
1  
w (s)
(   1)
 1| {z }
Price
  gx2 (s) (1   )

sd
@sd
@| {z }
Selection
, () (s) < 0
where gx2 is given in (5.2). The price e¤ect increases the marginal price of skills (on the left hand
side) and the component of the wage coming from the export market (on the right hand side). The
former always receives a higher weight, since part of the adjustment on the rent level goes through
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prots. This force points towards an increase in local inequality.
Under Assumption 1, the selection e¤ect is always pushing ws(s)ws(s) upward, in positive territory
(recall that @sd=@ < 0), and more than
w (s)
w(s) : as it happens for domestic sellers, trade integration
lowers the price index, puts an upward pressure on real wages of production workers and makes
the selection in the manager occupation stricter. This is a force towards the reduction of local
inequality.
Overall, the price e¤ect always prevails, and trade integration increases local inequality for
exporters.
We can then state the following proposition (proven in Appendix A.4), which states that the
unique threshold ability beyond which trade increases local inequality coincides with the exporters
cuto¤ ability, sx.
Proposition 3. There exists a unique skill level s() = sx such that the local change in inequality
is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s)  0, s  s().
Under Assumption 1, trade integration is producing increasing dispersion of the wages in the
high part of the wage distribution and a compression of wages in the lower part. Evaluating the
evolution of wage dispersion in di¤erent regions of the wage distribution is then not su¢ cient to
disentangle the source of the pattern. Note also that for very closed economies, intra-industry trade
cannot have a role in increases in inequality at the bottom (the cuto¤ sx will be relatively high),
but it does cause increases in inequality at the top of the distribution.
If f > =, Assumption 1 is not satised, local inequality decreases for both non-exporters
and exporters (see proof of Proposition 3), and that the qualitative consequences of skill-biased
technical change and trade integration no longer coincide. In this case, the selection e¤ect on
w (s)
w(s) is receiving a weight so high that the total price of skills is always more sensitive than the
marginal price of skills, and local inequality decreases at all levels with trade integration.
Assumption 1 is then crucial for trade to imply the same qualitative behavior of skill-biased
technical change and its validity is ultimately an empirical question. Note that along a path of
skill-biased technical change (increase in ), this assumption tends to be more and more restricitive.
In absence of any information on its validity, we cannot exclude that trade has a role in causing
the observed pattern of wage dispersion only on the basis of the wage distribution in the overall
economy. I argue in the discussion which follows that intra-rm rent distribution can provide an
alternative source of information which does not rely on Assumption 1.
6 Intra-Firm Rent Distribution
A larger wage dispersion at the top and smaller wage dispersion at the bottom of the distribution
can be caused both by skill-biased technical change and by trade integration, so that information
only on the wage distribution is not enough. The following question naturally arises: are there
rm-level outcomes that have a di¤erent response to these two sources of changes in inequality?
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And are these responses independent on the validity of Assumption 1? In this simple framework,
the answer is yes to both questions.
The rent created in a rm by a manager and an idea is given by the sum of prots and managers
wage (i.e., the surplus) less their opportunity cost in the alternative occupation. Noting that the
assignment (2.5) allows us to write z (s) =z (sd) = s=sd, we can use the earning functions (4.13) and
(4.14) to express the rent for an exporting and a non-exporting rm as
 (z (s)) + w (s)  w 
8><>:

s
sd
1    1 s 2 [sd; sx) 
1 + 1 
 
s
sd
1    (1 + f) s  sx
The share of this rent that goes to managers is then
 ()  w (s)  w
 (z (s)) + w (s)  w = 
where   = (+ ); a share 1    () = 1    is then left for prots. This fact is true for any
rm, independently of its export status. Moreover, Assumption 1 may or may not hold, without
compromising the validity of this result.
The intra-rm rent distribution is only a function of the relative contribution of types to the
overall productivity of the rm. In particular, it is not a function of the level of trade integration,
not even in exporting rms. The economic force that drives this result is the positive assortative
matching between managers and ideas: in equilibrium, the wage function equates the marginal
benets and costs of a better manager in all markets where the rm chooses to sell, so that a
fraction  of the additional rent that a larger ability generates in each market is given to the
manager. Hence, while trade integration a¤ects the level of the rents reaped by a rm, it does not
a¤ect the way in which this rent is shared.
This suggests that a promising avenue for disentangling the two e¤ects is to look at the intra-rm
rent distribution. Firm-level data on employers and employees, properly interpreted, can give us a
handle on the evolution of . Changes in inequality not accompanied by changes in the intra-rm
rent distribution must be attributed to trade. Vice-versa, changes in the intra-rm rent distribution
must imply changes in local inequality and wage ratios caused by skill-biased technical change.
A simple way to implement this analysis would be the following. Let the total value added
of a rm ' be V A ('), and denote with Ws (') and Wu (') the total payments to skilled and
unskilled workers, respectively. Assume that a rm with Ls (') skilled workers is actually a set
of Ls (') production lines, i.e., each skilled worker would be a manager. The surplus v (') in
the model is then v^ (')  (V A (') Wu (')) =Ls ('). To move from the surplus to the rent,
we must have an estimate of the opportunity cost of the skilled workers: we can use the wage
of an unskilled worker in the same rm, w^u (')  Wu (') =Lu (') : Hence, the average rent in a
rm is v^ (')   w^u ('), and the share of this rent going to the "manager" would be estimated to
^ (')  (w^s (')  w^u (')) = (v^ (')  w^u (')), where w^s (') Ws (') =Ls (') is the average wage for
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skilled workers. It is easy to show that for ^ (') 2 (0; 1), we need that the wage per skilled worker
is larger than the wage per unskilled worker and that there are some payments to capital22.
The model would predict that this share is constant across rms, and is not a¤ected by trade
integration, so that changes in the average  over time would measure the intensity of skill-biased
technical change.
7 Conclusion
I have shown how changes in local inequality determine the behavior of wage ratios across the ability
spectrum. Although through partially di¤erent channels, local inequality responds in similar ways
to both skill-biased technical change and trade integration: both shocks have asymmetric e¤ects
across rms, raising the competitive pressure on low productivity rms and favoring rms at the
high end of the productivity range, which are also the rms which employ higher skilled managers.
Hence, skill-biased technical change and trade integration can - under appropriate parameters
restrictions - both reproduce divergent patterns of wage ratios in the lower and the upper tail of
the wage distribution, and increasing ratios at all levels in the upper tail, thus being consistent
with the evidence on wage inequality in the last 50 years in the United States.
This result suggests the need to go beyond analyses based on wage distributions that do not
consider also the rms that contribute to determine the level of wage as an equilibrium outcome. I
argue that deeper, rm-level considerations of the mechanisms of operation of each force may help
in the quantication of the magnitude of each channel. Since skill-biased technical change operates
by increasing the importance of heterogeneity in technology in the determination of the relative
fortune of di¤erent rms, managers get in each rm a smaller share  of the rent. On the other
hand, international trade inuences the market size and the marginal cost of each rm, while it
does not change the intra-rm rent distribution.
I acknowledge that this model is still too stylized in many respects, rst of all the one-to-one
matching assumption, to attempt a serious quantication of the importance of these two mech-
anisms; however, it has the virtue of uncovering the link between micro-level behavior and the
aggregate evolution of wage ratios, and emphasize potential relations among observable rm-level
outcomes and two of the most important and studied macro-economic changes in (at least) the
last half century. With more articulated frameworks, estimates of the evolution of intra-rm rent
distribution, possibly based on the use of employer-employee matched data sets, can put (at least) a
bound on the degree of skill-biased technical change, and help disentangle the size of each channel.
I leave this for future research.
22Note that, substituting the denitions given in the text, ^ (')  Ws(')=Ls(') Wu(')=Lu(')
(V A(') Wu('))=Ls(') Wu(')=Lu(') . Assume that
the numerator in ^ (') is positive (i.e., the average wage for skilled workers is larger than the average wage for
unskilled workers); then the estimated share will be smaller than 1 as long as
(V A (') Wu (')) =Ls (') Ws (') =Ls (') > 0() V A (') > Wu (') +Ws (')
i.e., as long as there are some payment to capital. If this is true, then it is also su¢ cient for ^ (') to be positive, since
the requirement would be V A (') =Ls (') > Wu (') (1=Lu (') + 1=Lu ('))() V A (') > w^u (') (Ls (') + Lu (')).
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A Proof of Results
A.1 The Local Change in Inequality
For two ability levels s00 > s0, we want to study the direction of the change in w (s00) =w (s0) as
 increases. Denote with w (s) the derivative of the wage function with respect to , and with
" (s)  w (s) =w (s) the point elasticity of the wage. Then, the elasticity of the wage ratio with
respect to , call it " (s0; s00), is simply " (s00)  " (s0). Since the choice of the percentiles (and then
the abilities) is arbitrary, it is convenient to express this elasticity as
"
 
s0; s00

=
Z s00
s0
@" (s)
@s
ds
The elasticity of the wage with respect to  generally varies with the ability level: the function
@" (s) =@s describes this dependence. Moreover, its sign will determine if the local contribution of
the ability level s is to increase or decrease all the wage ratios that contain it. Calculating @"(s)@s
explicitly,
@" (s)
@s
=
ws (s)
w (s)
() (s)
() (s)  ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
where ws (s) is the marginal wage at s and ws (s) is the cross-partial derivative of the wage function
with respect to  and s: The sign of () (s) is what matters to determine the direction of the local
change in inequality.
A.2 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Closed Economy
Recall that eq. (3.1) denes () (s)  ws(s)ws(s)  
w(s)
w(s) :
Di¤erentiating (2.14) with respect to , multiplying by =w (s), and normalizing w to 1, we
have
w (s)
w (s)
=
 (   1)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

 j (s)  1
1   + h (s) j (s)

(A.1)
ws (s)
ws (s)
= (   1)h (s) (A.2)
with
j (s) 

s
sc
1  
h (s)  ln s
sc
  (+ ) 1
sc
@sc
@
and where we recall that   = (+ ) and   1  (   1) (+ ). The function j (s) is always
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greater than or equal to 1, j0 (s) > 0, and is such that lims!sc j (s) = 1, lims!1 j (s) = +1. The
function h (s) is always increasing in s and has the properties lims!sc h (s) =   (+ ) 1sc @sc@ < 0,
since the cuto¤ sc is increasing in  (this is immediate from eq. (2.12)), and lims!1 h (s) = +1;
hence, h (s) crosses zero only once.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique skill level s() > sc such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
Proof. For () (s) > 0 is necessary and su¢ cient that ws(s)ws(s)  
w(s)
w(s) is positive. Using (A.1)
and (A.2) in this di¤erence and rearranging, we have
() (s)  0, ws (s)
ws (s)
  w (s)
w (s)
> 0,
(1  )h (s) >   1
1    (j (s)  1)
The left-hand side starts at (1  )h (sc) < 0 and always increases with s, crossing zero only once,
while the right-hand side starts in zero and always decreases with s. Hence, there is one and only
one s() such that () (s)  0 , s  s(). This s() is the unique solution of (1  )h  s() =
  11  
 
j
 
s()
  1. Note that if h (sc) were zero, the left- and right-hand side would touch for
s = sc and then diverge from each other, so that we would have s() = sc and no region with a
negative local change in inequality.
A.3 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Open Economy
The elasticity of wage to skill is now a piecewise function of the form

w (s)
@w (s)
@
=
(
  (1  ) gd1 (s) + gd2 (s) (   1)h (s) s 2 (sd; sx)
  (1  ) gd1 (s) + gx2 (s) (   1)h (s) s > sx
with
h (s) 

ln
s
sd
  (+ ) 1
sd
@sd
@

gd1 (s) 
w (s)  1
w (s)
;
gd2 (s) 
w (s)  (1  )
w (s)
, gx2 (s) 
w (s)  [1   (1 + f)]
w (s)
However, the elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is always

ws (s)
ws (s) = (   1)h (s)
28
Proposition 2 There exists a unique skill level s() > sd such that the local change in inequality
from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e.,
() (s)  0, s  s().
Proof. For a domestic seller, s 2 (sd; sx), local inequality increases if and only if

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
,
h (s) >   
1  
1
1   (j (s)  1) (A.3)
In particular, as s ! sd, the inequality is never satised: for the worst managers, local inequality
always decreases. For an exporter, s  sx, local inequality increases if and only if

ws (s)
ws (s) >

wx (s)
@wx (s)
@
,
h (s) >   
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
1 + 1 

j (s)  (1 + f) (A.4)
Note that in both (A.3) and (A.4), (i) the left-hand side is always increasing in s, while (ii)
the right-hand side is always non-positive and decreasing (in (A.4) it is decreasing because, by
assumption, f < =, [1   (1 + f)] > 0): for the values of s where each relation applies, if the
inequality is satised for an s0, it is also satised for all s > s0, and vice-versa, if it is not satised
for an s0, it is also not true for all s < s0. To prove the existence of this threshold and identify the
region it falls in, I will check the value of each inequality at s = sx. Then, let:
lhs ()  h (s) js=sx =
ln f1=(1  )1=(+)
1 + f  =(1  ) 1=(+)
  (+ ) (   1)
2 = 2
1 +  1 

rhsd ()    
1  
1
1   (j (sx)  1) =  

1  
1
1   
 
f 1   1
rhsx ()    
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
1 + 1 

j (s)  (1 + f) =   
1   (1 + f)
1
1   
 
f 1   1
These functions describe the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (A.3) and (A.4) when s = sx.
Note that rhsd () > rhsx () 8 . The function lhs () can be in three positions with respect
to this inequality.
(i) Suppose that rhsd () > rhsx () > lhs (): at s = sx inequality (A.4) is not satised, and
the local inequality for the worst exporters is decreasing; then, local inequality is also decreasing
among the best domestic sellers, since rhsd () > lhs () : The relation (A.3) is never satised
for s 2 [sd; sx), local inequality is decreasing among all domestic sellers, and there must exists a
threshold s() > sx such that local inequality decreases below it and increases above it.
(ii) Suppose that lhs () > rhsd () > rhsx () : at s = sx inequality (A.3) is satised, and
local inequality for the best domestic sellers is increasing; then, local inequality is also increasing
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among all exporters, i.e., lhs () > rhsx (). The relation (A.4) is always satised for s  sx, local
inequality is then increasing among all exporters, while there must exists a threshold s() 2 (sd; sx)
such that local inequality increases above it and decreases below.
(iii) Suppose that rhsd () > lhs () > rhsx (): at s = sx, (A.3) is not satised while (A.4) is,
and so local inequality increases for all exporters and decreases for all non-exporters. In this cased
dd , s() = sx. Also, since rhsd () > rhsx () holds strictly and lhs () changes continuously with  ,
this case is not a knife-edge possibility: it will happen for  2 (d; x), with d : rhsd (d) = lhs (d)
and x : rhsx (x) = lhs (x).
To show that each of these three cases can actually occur, suppose f = 1. Then, lim!1 lhs () <
0, lim!1 rhsd () = lim!1 rhsx () = 0. Since, as  !1, lhs () goes monotonically to +1 while
both rhs functions go monotonically to  1 , lhs () will cross once rhsx () and then rhsd () from
below. In this construction, moving  from autarky (+1) to perfect integration ( = 1) will let
the economies visit case (ii), (iii) and nally (i).
A.4 Trade Integration
Recall that, di¤erentiating (4.14) for domestic sellers, and using j (s)  (s=sd)(+)( 1),
w (s) =  (   1) j (s) 1
sd
@sd
@
ws (s) =  (   1) (1   ) s 1j (s) 1
sd
@sd
@
so that the elasticity of wage to  is
w (s)

w (s)
=   (1   ) j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

sd
@sd
@
(A.5)
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is
ws (s)

ws (s)
=
 (   1) (1   ) s 1j (s) sd
@sd
@
(1   ) s 1j (s) =   (1   )

sd
@sd
@
(A.6)
For exporters, the relevant functions are:
w (s) =  j (s) (   1)

(+ )
1
sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+  

ws (s) =   (1   ) s 1j (s) (   1)

(+ )
1
sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+  

so that the elasticity of wage to  is
w (s)

w (s)
=
 j (s) (   1)
h
(+ ) sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1 
i
 [j (s) (1 + 1 )  (1 + f)] + 1 (A.7)
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and the elasticity of the marginal price of skills to  is
ws (s)

ws (s)
=
  (   1)
h
(+ ) sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1 
i
(1 + 1 )
(A.8)
Also, note that the square bracket is positive, since, di¤erentiating (4.11) and using   1=(+)f =(1  )
(+ )

sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+ 1  =   1
1 + 
 
1 + 1 

+ 1  > 0,
(1 + ) 1  > 1 + 1  ,   1f =(1  ) > 1
which is always true.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique skill level s() = sx such that the local change in inequality
is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., () (s)  0, s  s():
Proof. Local inequality increases with trade integration if and only if () (s) < 0.
For domestic sellers, using (A.5) and (A.6), this will happen if and only if
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
,   (1   ) 
sd
@sd
@
<
 (   1) j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1

sd
@sd
@
,
1 <
j (s)
 (j (s)  1) + 1 , 1   < 0
which is never true. Hence, local inequality always decreases for domestic sellers.
For exporters, using (A.7) and (A.8) local inequality increases if
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
,
  (   1)
h
(+ ) 1sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+  
i
(1 + 1 )
 <
 j (s) (   1)
h
(+ ) 1sd
@sd
@
 
1 + 1 

+  
i

 [j (s) (1 + 1 )  (1 + f)] + 1
Since the term in the square bracket is always positive, we can simplify further to obtain
ws (s)

ws (s)
< w (s)

w (s)
, 1
(1 + 1 )
>
j (s)
 [j (s) (1 + 1 )  (1 + f)] + 1
, 1   (1 + f) > 0, f < 

Hence, local inequality increases for exporters as trade barriers fall if and only if f < =:
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